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1 Introduction
In 1992 virtually all the countries of the world signed, and ratified, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change whose ultimate objective is
to achieve the ’stabilization of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inference with the climate
system’. Five years later, the Kyoto Protocol was signed, engaging the countries
included in Annex I (OECD and economies in transition) to reduce their overall
emission by five per cent in 2012 compared to 1990. This agreement was further
discussed and refined, and in 2001, almost all the countries in the world (with the
only significant absence of the United States of America) agreed on the Marrakech
Accords, which are expected to enable enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol (this
requires that countries accounting for 55% of Annex I carbon dioxide emissions
ratify it1).
Although it is fair to acknowledge that the industrialized countries (IC) are the
main historic, and present, causers of anthropogenic climate change, the solution
of the problem will need the implication of the developing countries (DC) in a
more comprehensive way than the one proposed in the Kyoto Protocol (based on
projects). This is especially true if we assume that the DC will be able to develop
as fast as they need. In fact, the incorporation of the DC is the main issue on
the negotiation agenda and the absence of binding targets for the DC was one of
the main arguments used by President Bush to reject the Kyoto Protocol.
In the next negotiation rounds we shall see the North (the Annex-I countries
which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol) negotiating with the South (Non-Annex I
countries) the most convenient way to bring them on board. The North, led by the
European Union, has recognized its historical responsibility (in official texts but
also accepting to be the first one to reduce) and should be ready to compensate the
South in some way for accepting limitations to their urgently needed development.
This compensation could take the form of monetary transfers but could also be
based on other type of advantages.
Until now the DC have talked in the international climate change arena with
a single voice, the so-called ”G77 and China” group. Nevertheless, until now, the
DC, although Parties of the negotiations, have not been affected by binding reduc-
tions. Thus, they have been less involved in the ”hard part” of the negotiations.
In the new context, the Southern countries have to decide whether they continue
to talk with a single voice or whether they split up into two or more groups (the
G77 and China is a highly heterogeneous group, including small countries highly
vulnerable to climate change and countries like Saudi Arabia strongly interested
in oil exports). Talking together gives bargaining power, but under some cir-
cumstances, it may be more convenient to split up to take advantage of internal
differences. Rotillon et al. (1996) analysed this issue with complete information
1As well as 55 countries, including Annex I as well as Non-Annex I countries.
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and particular benefit functions. Nevertheless, official statistics in the South are
rare and incomplete and real knowledge about the abatement costs and options
in the South are not at all available to the North. On the contrary, due to the
high amount of existing studies, and due to the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol, the South will have almost complete information about the cost and
benefit functions of the North. Hence, we discuss this issue in the context of
asymmetric information and with general functional forms.
Finally, if the Southern countries decide to split up into two groups (e.g.),
these groups can be complementary or substitutable. We call them complemen-
tary if the North needs to sign an agreement with both groups to be effective.
Substitutable implies that an agreement with one of the groups is enough to pro-
duce positive benefits. At first glance, the Southern groups should be considered
substitutable in the case of climate change since if one group, e.g. representing
50% of the Southern emissions, accepts to reduce its future emissions (or to in-
crease them less) this will have a positive effect on climate change. Nevertheless,
the opposite situation is also possible. As described above, in 1997 the Kyoto
Protocol was signed, but stating that it will only come into force if countries rep-
resenting 55% of Annex I emissions ratify it. This gave Russia and other countries
a lot of bargaining power since they became complementary, especially after the
withdrawal of the United States. This situation might be repeated if an initial
Protocol states that the DC will only be obliged to reduce their emission patterns
if DC representing 55% (e.g.) of Non-Annex I emissions ratify it2. Hence, we
discuss in our model the circumstances under which the South is interested in
pushing for such a situation.
Another relevant characteristic of international negotiations, and in particular
of climate change negotiations, is that they take a great deal of time to conclude.
In principle, if negotiators were rational, we should expect them to finish in one
single negotiation round. Nevertheless, the delay in the negotiations can be used,
and has been used in the past, to take advantage and to gain better knowledge
of the characteristics of the opponent. Therefore, we model the negotiations in a
dynamic framework to analyse the circumstances under which the Parties benefit
from delaying the agreement.
Game theory literature on cooperation in the context of climate change has
followed two approaches3, although both of them assimilate cooperation and co-
ordination of environmental policies. On the one hand, we have what Tulkens
(1998) called the thesis of the ”small stable coalitions” (Carraro and Siniscalco,
1993; Barret, 1994; Pe´reau and Tazda¨ıt, 2001; among others). On the other
hand, we have the thesis of the ”grand stable coalition” (Chander and Tulkens,
1997; Egteren and Tang, 1997; Funaki and Yamato, 1999; Helm, 2001; among
others). According to the first approach, only a small number of countries will
2In fact, this kind of clause is common in international agreements.
3For a survey see Finus (2001).
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accept to sign an agreement (the stability concept used comes from the analy-
sis of cartels in industrial economics). In this framework, a coalition including
all countries is not sustainable since the benefits arising from cooperation are
a public good (distributed to all countries), while the costs are borne only by
the countries forming the coalition. On the contrary, in the second approach
all countries are interested in cooperation (taken individually or in sub-groups).
According to Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) an agreement should not only
be based on pareto optimality to be effective, but should also prevent any sub-
group of countries to be interested in secession. Hence, the objective is to set up
a burden-sharing rule able to favour the cooperation of all. However, these two
approaches have in common that the negotiating process has been completely ig-
nored, as well as significant characteristics like information asymmetry, countries
heterogeneity4, or even the possibilities of renegotiation. In the non-cooperative
games evoked by Carraro and Siniscalco, negotiation is modelled as simultaneous
discourse, not leaving any space to dialogue (i.e. the possibility of carrying out
counter-propositions). In the models of endogenous coalition formation (Chander
and Tulkens, 1995, 1997), cooperation is the result of the direct intervention of a
third party: a supranational authority acting as a central planner. This central
planner is assumed to be good-willed, to defend the global interests and to have
enforcement power; somehow irrealistic assumptions in the context of real climate
change negotiations.
To overcome these limitations, we analyse future climate change negotia-
tions in a dynamic framework, with asymmetric information, with heterogeneous
coalitions and explicitly including the possibility to make counter-propositions
(remark that bargaining games are strictly competitive games, since this may
be useful for the interpretation of our results). In technical terms, we develop
a sequential game with asymmetric information in a bilateral, as well as in a
multilateral framework. Therefore, we deal with hidden knowledge issues and
signalling theory; and look for pooling and separating equilibria. This model is
set out using general functional forms and could therefore be applied to most of
the current and future discussions between the North and the South. It applies,
more generally, to all circumstances where negotiations take place between, on
the one hand, one player whose characteristics are well known and who is ready
to pay the other players to obtain something, and, on the other hand, one or two
players whose characteristics are not known.
The article is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the general model.
In section 3, we analyse the outcomes of the game with complete information.
The study of the negotiation with incomplete information is proposed in section
4. Finally, section 5 highlights the main conclusions.
4Most of the work with heterogeneous countries is based on numerical simulations (Barrett,
1997; Botteon and Carraro, 1997, 1998) and hence does not provide general results. The the-
oretical work available has been developed within the highly restricted framework of countries
characterised by specific welfare functions (Hoel, 1992; Heal, 1994).
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2 The model
We analyse a bargaining game between the North (Annex I countries which have
ratified the Kyoto Protocol), which is assumed to be neutral to risk, and a group
of developing countries (e.g. the G77 and China). The negotiation is about the
value of the transfers that the North (N) will grant to countries of the South (S)
willing to cooperate and commit themselves. The Southern countries are assumed
to be identical and C in number. To assume identical countries could be seen as
a limitation (see above); however, it is important to recall that we are assuming
that all the countries of the Southern coalition talk with a single voice. Therefore,
there is no problem in considering that a country like China has more votes (parts
of C) in the internal vote (in fact, C could also refer to the amount of emissions
as in the example described in the introduction). We call 0 < δi < 1 the discount
rate of agent i, i = N,S . The monetary transfer (or other type of advantage)
granted by the North is noted τ . The benefit for the North is the difference
between the abatement reached (B(C) = B), and the cost of the transfers to the
C countries of the Southern coalition (τC):
Π(τ, t) = δtN [B − τC] (1)
The utility function of the Southern coalition is:
U(τ, t) = δtS[(τ − b)C] (2)
We assume that the minimum amount of transfers asked for by the Southern
coalition (b) is decided in an internal vote among the coalition (as it occurs
in the international negotiations, where G77 and China have private meetings
where they decide their position). With this amount of transfers b the utility is
zero. We also define the ”reservation transfer”, as the maximum transfer that
the North can accept. This amount is given by the benefits that the North
obtains from the reductions in the South (we assume that the negotiation is
about the amount of transfers for a given level of Southern effort). The maximum
transfer level is B/C, and the benefit for the North would be zero. That is, the
negotiation area is bounded by b and B/C. Thus, for B/C < b, the agreement
set is empty. To make the agreement possible, we assume B > Cb. All the
elements of the negotiation are known, except the minimum amount of transfers
that is acceptable to the Southern group. This amount can have two possible
values b− and b+ (i.e. b ∈ {b−, b+}), where b− < b+ < B/C . The Northern
negotiator has an a priori probability function for these values: pN(b
+) = p+ and
pN(b
−) = p− = 1− p+.
The players propose offers alternatively, which refer to the amount of transfers
for a given effort. The negotiation goes on with no time limit. We call the game
where the North (respectively the South) makes the first offer J∞N (J
∞
S ). Let us
analyse the structure of the J∞N game.
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The North proposes an amount of transfers τN . The South accepts (Yes) or
refuses (No) the proposition. If the South accepts, an agreement is signed in the
first period. The objective functions of the agents are:
Π(τN , 0) = B − τNC and U(τN , 0) = (τN − b)C
If the South rejects the offer, the negotiation continues with a counter-offer from
the South. If the North accepts this new offer, an agreement is signed in the
second period, with an amount of transfers τS. Thus:
Π(τS, 1) = δN [B − τSC] and U(τS, 1) = δS[(τS − b)C]
Otherwise, the negotiation starts again with a Northern offer τN . In the case of
an agreement:
Π(τN , 2) = δ
2
N [B − τNC] and U(τN , 2) = δ2S[(τN − b)C]
And so on. In the case of perpetual disagreement we get :
Π(τ0,∞) < Π(τ, t) and U(τ0,∞) < U(τ, t) for the final t.
We assume that both agents have a given preference for the present. Hence, for
two moments in time t and s, with t < s, we have:
Π(τ, t) ≥ Π(τ, s) and U(τ, t) ≥ U(τ, s)
with τ = b−, b+. The inequality will be strict if Π > 0 (respectively U > 0).
Since the acceptation of an offer closes the negotiation, a history in time t, ht,
describes a possible evolution of the negotiations from the beginning at date 0
until date t (including the behaviour in t). More precisely, it gives the sequence of
propositions leading to a disagreement, if there were propositions, knowing that
the North revises its beliefs taking into account the history. Call H the set of all
the possible histories and H t the set of all the possible histories with a duration
t. A pure strategy for i is a function fi where:
f ti : H
t−1
i → [b−, B/C] ∪ {Yes, No}
specifies after each history ht−1i (∈ H t−1i ) the behaviour of i at time t. In par-
ticular, it tells us if after ht−1i , i will propose a new offer, or refuse or accept
the offer of j. Hence, a history is formed either by a proposition between b−
and B/C, or by a refusal or an acceptation. This last choice can only appear at
t. The result of the negotiation will also depend upon the beliefs of the North.
The resolution of the dynamic game with incomplete information is based on the
concept of sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). By definition, a set
of strategies and a family of beliefs form a sequential equilibrium if the following
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two conditions hold: (i) the strategies of both players are optimal in all the points
of the game, given the beliefs of the North, and (ii) the beliefs of the North are
Bayesian5.
3 Complete information
3.1 Bilateral negotiation
Following a similar resolution method to the one proposed by Rubinstein (1982),
we calculate the unique perfect equilibrium with complete information to which
both players agree immediately in the first negotiation round (see Hovi (2001)
for an alternative application of this methodology to the Clean Development
Mechanism). The minimum amount of transfers b requested by S is supposed
to be common knowledge. Let τ ∗(N,S) be the equilibrium transfer when the
North opens the negotiations and τ ∗(S,N) the equilibrium transfer when it was
proposed by the South6. We obtain:
τ ∗(N,S) =
bC(1− δS) + δS(1− δN)B
(1− δNδS)C (3)
and
τ ∗(S,N) =
B(1− δN) + bCδN(1− δS)
(1− δNδS)C (4)
Concerning the position of the players in the game, we can formulate the
following corollary. It says that N (respectively S) prefers to play the game when
it opens the negotiations (J∞N , respectively J
∞
S ), instead of the opposite when it
responds (J∞S , respectively J
∞
N ).
Corollary 1 If J∞N and J
∞
S are two games with perfect information, being b
common knowledge, we obtain the following two expressions:
J∞N N J∞S
J∞S S J∞N
Proof. We can see that:
τ ∗(S,N) > τ ∗(N,S)⇐⇒ B > Cb
Since by definition B > Cb, the inequality always holds.
S wishes to obtain the highest amount of transfers and prefers the situation where
5We could also adopt a perfect bayesian equilibrium concept. However, as Kreps and Wilson
(1982) show, this concept has the drawback that it defines a great amount of solutions, while
the sequential equilibrium permits to restrain them.
6These transfer equilibria are derived from a backward induction reasoning (Rubinstein,
1982).
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τ = τ ∗(S,N), i.e. the amount of transfers that it obtains in the game where it
talks first. On the contrary, N wishes to obtain the lowest amount of transfers
and prefers the situation where τ = τ ∗(N,S), i.e. the amount of transfers that it
obtains in the game where it talks first.
3.2 Multilateral negotiation
Let us now consider the case where the South is organised in two separate groups,
Si, i = 1, 2, representing Ci countries, with C1 + C2 = C. The benefit obtained
by the North from the abatement of group i is noted Bi, i = 1, 2. The aim is to
study the union and disunity behaviours of the groups in complete information
according to their degree of complementarity and substitutability. We assume
that within each group, the members vote to determine their minimum level
of transfer claims. Let bi (i = 1, 2) be the transfer requested by the group i
(resulting from the internal vote within each group) and b the transfer requested
by the groups while acting together (resulting from the internal vote within the
group formed by both sub-groups).
The bargaining process has the same characteristics as previously described.
The game consists in alternative offers and the North makes the initial ones (one
offer to each group). If one group accepts the offer while the other refuses, the
negotiation with the former group is finished; going on with the latter group. If
both groups simultaneously refuse (accept), the negotiation keeps going on (ends)
with both groups. This process goes on until an agreement is reached.
Let 0 < δS < 1 be the fixed discount rate of the groups (joined or separated).
We have ∀i = 1, 2:
τ ∗(N,Si) =
biCi(1− δS) + δS(1− δN)Bi
(1− δNδS)Ci (5)
Both groups will accept to form a unique alliance if, by their cohesion, they reach
a more satisfactory level than they would have reached acting separately:
U1 + U2 < U (6)
where Ui is the utility of the groups (∀i = 1, 2). Condition (6) involves:
bC − b1C1 − b2C2 < B −B1 −B2 (7)
Let us define Vi = (B − bC)− (Bj − bjCj), i 6= j, the maximum contribution of
group i to the benefit of the North. Condition (7) is rewritten as follows:
V1 + V2 > B − bC (8)
The two Southern groups should act together when the North benefits from ne-
gotiating separately with each of them. This only happens if the distribution rule
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among the members of the Southern group allows them to obtain more together
than what they would obtain separately. The North is only motivated to favour
two bilateral negotiations if it intends to propose a low level of transfers. In this
configuration, by standing separately, the bargaining power of the South is lower,
as their threat to refuse any agreement is less credible. If one group tries to use
that threat, the North will propose a slightly more interesting offer to the other
group. Being confronted with two distinct groups, it could propose a low level of
transfers and take advantage of the disunity and lead both Southern groups to
accept its offer. To foil that strategy, the two groups have to act together.
If condition (8) is not respected, the Southern groups should participate sep-
arately in the negotiations. In this case, the North is inclined to propose a high
level of transfers from the beginning of the negotiation. Since the North proposes
a high level of transfers, its intention is to conclude an agreement as soon as
possible . Each group is therefore incited to take advantage of that situation
by accepting the overbid game. The separation of the groups accentuates this
behaviour and increases their bargaining power. Hence, we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 1
1. When V1 + V2 > B − bC, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists in
which the groups act jointly.
2. When V1 + V2 < B − bC, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists in
which the groups act separately.
The outcome of the negotiations depends widely on the degree of commitment
of the North. It defines the whole process of negotiations by making the first offer.
If the Southern countries anticipate a moderate commitment, they will be united
during the negotiations, since that will give them significant bargaining power.
Conversely, if they anticipate a high commitment, they will be dissociated into
two separate groups.
We will now analyse the behaviour of the Southern groups according to their
degree of substitutability and complementarity. The groups are said complemen-
tary when the two groups have to sign the agreement so that benefits can arise
(see introduction). They are called substitutable when the agreement can be
reached with only one of the groups. If we accept perfect complementarity, an
agreement signed by only one group has no impact. Therefore, ∀Ci, i = 1, 2, we
have V1 = V2 = 0. Hence:
V1 + V2 < B − bC (9)
Since relation (9) always holds for the complementary groups, we assume that
they will act separately during negotiations. In this way both can unilaterally
compromise the negotiations in case of disagreement. On the other hand, when
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the groups are substitutable, they had better act together to preserve their bar-
gaining power. The following expression is found inverting equation (6):
V1 + V2 > B − bC (10)
According to the North, the inequality (10) means that the maximum ad-
ditional contribution to the Northern payoff of the two united groups is low.
Thus, an agreement with one of the groups is enough. We obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 2
1. When the two groups are perfectly complementary, they will act separately.
2. When the two groups are perfectly substitutable, they will act jointly.
When the Southern groups are complementary; the North would like to ne-
gotiate with the united groups. Conversely, the Southern groups will adopt the
asymmetric behaviour. Being complementary, they are aware of being the driving
forces and that incites them to become two distinct groups. Such behaviour gives
them bargaining power and allows them to request a higher amount of transfers.
When the groups are substitutable; the North needs to conclude an agreement
with only one of them. Conversely, the Southern groups are incited to act united
to preserve their bargaining power. Nevertheless, that alliance is fragile since one
of the groups can betray its partner accepting a slightly lower level of transfers,
which guarantees the signing of an agreement.
4 One-sided incomplete information
4.1 Bilateral negotiation
We now analyse the game in which the North opens the negotiations and does
not know the amount of transfers requested by the Southern countries. We might
justify this situation as follows: the North has complete, easily accessible statis-
tics, as well as a high amount of studies estimating the costs of climate change
policy in the North. In addition, the North (formed by the IC which have ratified
the Kyoto Protocol) will have started its climate change policy and revealed its
reduction potentials. On the contrary, in most of the Southern countries statistics
are incomplete and the knowledge about the cost of alternative climate change
policies is not well known. Therefore, the South has better information about
the amount of transfers that it can request compared to the information available
to the North about the minimum level of transfers (or other benefits) that the
South would accept.
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To simplify, we assume that the amount of transfers requested by the South-
ern group can take two values: b− and b+, with b− < b+ < B/C. Either it is low,
and we will call the group type b−, or it is high and the group will be of type
b+. According to Harsanyi (1967), this game is formalised by introducing a new
player, Nature, which selects the group b+ (respectively b−) as the Northern op-
ponent with probability p+ (respectively 1− p+). The distribution of probability
is common knowledge.
Since we use the concept of sequential equilibrium, we have to specify the
form of the beliefs of the North. We will define pessimistic beliefs7 (Rubinstein,
1988). Hence, each time an event of probability zero appears, the North considers
that it is facing b+.
The relation b− < b+ < B/C means that the North is in a position of strength
faced with b−, while it is in a position of weakness faced with b+ (who has stronger
transfer demands). Within the game in complete information, the equilibrium
transfer issued from the negotiation with b+ is higher or equal to the equilibrium
transfer in the negotiation with b−. Hence:
τ ∗(N,S+) ≥ τ ∗(N,S−) (11)
With one-sided incomplete information, b− is interested in persuading the North
that it has strong demands. Therefore, its strategy consists in adopting behaviour
similar to b+. Lemmas (1) to (4) show this result.
Lemma 1 If in any sequential equilibrium of the game J∞N , two types of
Southern groups propose a counter-offer, they will make the same one. In this
case, b− is interested in suggesting a counter-offer identical to the one proposed
by b+.
Lemma 2 In any sequential equilibrium of J∞N :
a) If b− refuses a proposition τN , b+ is interested in doing as well.
b) Conversely, if b+ accepts a proposition τN , it is in the interest of b
− to do
as well.
Lemma 3 In any sequential equilibrium of J∞N , a group, whatever its type,
will accept any offer τN that satisfies:
τN ≥ (1− δS)b+ δSτ ∗(S+, N) (12)
As the range of possibilities of b− is larger than those of b+, there are levels of
transfer τN likely to be accepted by the first and refused by the second. The
following lemma (4) confirms that.
7We retain that type of beliefs among the family of possible beliefs (optimistic, passive or
continued0x2026) since they are the most economically relevant within this model.
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Lemma 4 In any sequential equilibrium of J∞N , if:
(τ ∗(S+, N)− b−)δS + b− ≤ τN (13)
b− accepts the proposition τN while b+ rejects it and offers τ ∗(S+, N), which will
be accepted by N .
Lemmas (1) to (4) lead us to propositions (3) to (5) for the one-sided incom-
plete information game.
Proposition 3 In any sequential equilibrium of the game J∞N where the North is
characterised by pessimistic beliefs and where equation (13) is satisfied, we obtain
the following results:
1. If:
p+ <
C[τ ∗(N,S+)− τN ]
B(1− δN) + C[δNτ ∗(S+, N)− τN ] = g
The North proposes the level of transfers τN . b
− accepts it while b+ refuses
it to make a counter-offer τ ∗(S+, N), accepted by the North.
2. If p+ > g, the North proposes the level of transfers τ ∗(N,S+) which is
immediately accepted by the Southern groups whatever their type.
3. If p+ = g, two cases are conceivable:
- Either the North proposes the transfer τ ∗(N,S+) which is immediately
accepted by the Southern group, whatever its type.
-Or it proposes the transfer τN that satisfies (13), but it is refused by b
+.
The counter-offer of b+ is then equal to τ ∗(S+, N) and is accepted by the
North.
The results of this proposition show that the asymmetry of information totally
favours b− as it is incited to adopt opportunistic behaviour. The North can
however determine the real characteristic of its opponent. For that, it just has
to propose a transfer τN that satisfies (13), which will be a sufficient incentive
for b− to accept and give up the option of making a counter-offer. Nevertheless,
since τN > τ
∗(N,S−), b−, although forced to reveal its characteristics, benefits
from its opportunism. Let us add that the situation of the North is even more
unfavourable if equation (13) does not hold. The following proposition illustrates
this situation.
Proposition 4 In any sequential equilibrium of the game J∞N where the North
is characterised by pessimistic beliefs and where the relation (13) does not hold,
if the North opens the negotiations proposing τ ∗(N,S−), it will be refused by the
Southern groups whatever their type.
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However, the asymmetry of information does not have a great impact on
the date of signing of an agreement. The following proposition shows that an
agreement will be rapidly obtained.
Proposition 5 In any sequential equilibrium of the game J∞N characterised by
an asymmetry favourable to the Southern groups, the negotiations will never last
more than two periods.
This proposition is similar to the one developed by Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990). The idea is as follows: Suppose an agreement is reached at the period
n (n ∈ ℵ∗) on a proposition of the Southern group. Lemma (1) defines the
behaviour of b−. Its strategy consists in imitating the behaviour of b+ by making
the same counter-offer. Thus, whatever the type of group, the counter-offers
will be τ ∗(S+, N). In addition, the North is not interested in prolonging the
negotiations until the period n, since it can accept the transfer τ ∗(S+, N) at the
second period, obtaining higher earnings due to its preference for the present.
Hence, if a proposition τN is refused by both types of Southern groups, the
agreement can only emerge at the following period.
On the contrary, if the offer of first period τN is accepted by b
−, the North
can determine the real characteristics of its opponent. Therefore the North knows
that a counter-offer τS can only come from a b
+. Since it cannot increase its gain
by refusing, the North will accept τS. Thus, the negotiation will end at the second
period.
Finally, if the offer τN is a sufficient incentive to be accepted by the two types
of union, i.e. τN ≥ τ ∗(N,S+), the agreement will take place at the first period.
However, remark that this result is only valid for a situation where the in-
complete information is reduced to two possibilities. If the problem gets more
complicated, the agreement will no longer be reached at the second period.
Propositions (3) and (4) show that with asymmetry of information, two cat-
egories of agreements are likely to be signed. We can associate a sequential
equilibrium to each of these types of agreements.
On the one hand, an agreement is possible where b+ accepts the equilibrium
transfer obtained from the game without asymmetry of information. The equi-
librium transfer is τ ∗(S+, N) and b− accepts the offer τN defined by (13). We call
this sequential equilibrium ’separating’. The North is certain to determine the
characteristic of the Southern group. By proposing the transfer τN , only b
− will
accept it. In case of rejection, the North will suppose that its opponent is b+.
On the other hand, an agreement concluded on a transfer corresponding to b+,
is highly profitable for b−. This latter group obtains more than what it expected
in complete information. We find here a ’pooling’ sequential equilibrium. The
agreement doesn’t reflect the type of the contracting parties.
The importance of this second case depends strongly on the beliefs of the
North. There is a monotonous relation between the value p+ and the possible
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emergence of a pooling sequential equilibrium. The higher (lower) the initial belief
p+ of the North, the higher (lower) are the chances to meet an agreement with
a transfer τ ∗(N,S+) from the first negotiation round. Therefore, if the Southern
group was able to emit in a pre-game phase a signal not corresponding to its
type, the asymmetry could quickly favour them. Keeping personal information
plays an essential role in the bargaining process.
Proposition (5) shows that time takes a new strategic dimension in the pres-
ence of asymmetry of information. In this case, time favours the Southern groups.
We have seen that the strategy of b− is to adopt opportunistic behaviour, by
posting demands identical to the ones requested by b+. This strategy allows it
to emit a signal not corresponding to its own type. Furthermore, even if the
negotiations continue, the North is not able to discover the real characteristic of
the Southern group. Hence, to maintain the advantage granted by the asymme-
try of information, b− has to persevere and not change its strategy. Therefore,
the North is relunctant to prolong the negotiations, since it will not be able to
discover the real characteristics of its opponent. Taking into account the tempo-
ral dimension and its asymmetry of information, the North is eager to conclude
an agreement quickly. Nevertheless, this configuration favours b−. If the ini-
tial offer of the North is judged unsatisfactory, it will make a positive profit,
equal to τ ∗(S+, N) − τN , since its counter-offer is higher than the one it would
have requested in the absence of asymmetry of information. On the contrary, b+
will receive a transfer corresponding to its characteristics (whatever the initial
situation).
This proposition also shows that asymmetry of information could prolong the
negotiations, although an agreement is likely to be achieved at the second period.
This delay is a consequence of asymmetry of information, and corresponds to the
time needed by the North to determine the Southern group’s type.
4.2 Multilateral negotiation
We now analyse a negotiation between the North and two distinct Southern
groups S1 and S2. When the North is confronted with the group Si (i = 1, 2)
the associated distribution of probability is written PNi(b
+) = p+i and PNi(b
−) =
1− p+i . In extension to proposition (3), we have:
gi =
Ci[τ
∗(N,S+i )− τNi]
Bi(1− δN) + Ci[δNτ ∗(S+i , N)− τ ∗(N,S−i )]
i = 1, 2 (14)
Since we focus on configurations involving a delay during the negotiation, we
exclude the case where p+i > gi, (i = 1, 2). When p
+
i < gi (i = 1, 2) three cases
are conceivable according to the Southern groups’ characteristics.
In the first configuration the group j is of type b−j , and the group k is of type
b+k , j 6= k. Two sub-cases have to be considered. If both groups act together,
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they can claim either a transfer b−, and obtain an agreement during the first
stage, or a transfer b+, which will extend the negotiation to the second period.
Sub-case 1. If acting together b−j and b
+
k request b
−, they are interested in
separating themselves if and only if:
Uj(τNj, 0) + Uk(τ
∗(S+k , N), 1) > U(τN , 0) (15)
That involves:
b−j <
(1− δNδS)(Cb− − Ckb+k )− δN(1− δS)(Cb+ − Cjb+j − Ckb+k )
(1− δNδS)Cj
− (1− δN)(B −Bj −Bk)
(1− δNδS)Cj = α1 (16)
Sub-case 2. If acting together b−j and b
+
k request b
+, they are interested in
separating themselves if and only if:
Uj(τNj, 0) + Uk(τ
∗(S+k , N), 1) > U(τ
∗(S+, N), 1) (17)
Solving:
b−j <
(1− δNδS)(Cb+ − δSCkb+k )− (1− δS)(Cb+ − δNδSCjb+j − δNδSCkb+k )
δS(1− δNδS)Cj
− (1− δN)(B −Bj −Bk)
(1− δNδS)Cj = α2 (18)
Since it can easily be shown that α1 < α2, for b
−
j < α1 whatever the claim of
the union, the Southern groups favour disunity. For sub-case 1, b+k is confronted
with a delay while the union would lead to an agreement from the first stage. That
delay represents the necessary time for b+k to separate itself from b
−
j and reveal its
demands to the North. For the latter, these demands reveal the characteristics of
b+k only if it has previously determined the type of b
−
j . b
+
k would prefer disunity
if it would obtain a higher benefit by showing its type. That requires that b−j
concludes an agreement on a low level of transfers in the first period.
For sub-case 2, the negotiation delay is less costly for b+k than in the previ-
ous case, since the delay would also occur acting together. Two simultaneous
interpretations of the delay are possible. In the case of united groups, the de-
lay represents the time needed by the North to infer the type of coalition it is
confronted by. For the case of disunity, it describes the necessary time for b+k
to be dissociated from b−j . The sub-cases (1) and (2) correspond to a situation
where the groups are complementary. This configuration reinforces the bargain-
ing power of b+k . When it realizes that b
−
j wishes to demand a low transfer, it is
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interested in extending the negotiation to obtain a higher level of transfers in the
second period.
When the inequalities (16) and (18) are inverted, we end up with a situation
where the Southern groups are substitutable and act together. For the symmetric
sub-case (1), despite union, the negotiation goes on. The common action does
not give a sufficiently dissuasive bargaining power to end the negotiation in the
first round. The bargaining power of the union is compensated by the presence
of asymmetry of information, since the North uses the delay to determine the
characteristics of the Southern group. Although the agreement is signed with the
transfer τ ∗(S+, N), the union is confronted with a negotiation cost.
In the second configuration, we assume that the Southern group j is of type
b+j and the group k of type b
+
k . In this case the negotiation will end in the second
period even if there is no union. Disunity is favourable to the Southern groups if:
Uj(τ
∗(S+j , N), 1) + Uk(τ
∗(S+k , N), 1) > U(τ
∗(S+, N), 1) (19)
Solving:
b+k <
Bj +Bk −B + Cb+ − Cjb+j
Ck
(20)
Equation (20) corresponds to the condition of complementarity given by propo-
sition (1). It shows that each group is interested in acting separately when their
respective demands, although high, are not enough to take a relevant part of the
benefit. Despite their complementarity, each group has room to manoeuver until
a certain level. If this level is exceeded, the situation leads the groups to unite
to obtain the bargaining power allowing them to reach an agreement based on a
high level of transfers. This situation is associated to substitutability between the
groups. In both cases, we find the initial interpretation of the negotiation delay.
The delay becomes profitable to the North, it helps it to infer the characteristics
of each group or the union of groups.
Finally, in the third configuration, we suppose that the group j is of type b−j
and the group k of type b−k . The delay can take place when the groups act jointly
and require b+. Disunity is profitable if:
Uj(τNj, 0) + Uk(τNk, 0) > U(τ
∗(S+, N), 1) (21)
Solving:
b−k <
(1− δNδS)(Cb+ − Cjb−j )− δN(1− δS)(Cb+ − Cjb+j − Ckb+k )
(1− δN)Ck
− (B −Bj −Bk)
Ck
(22)
The Southern groups will favour disunity within a complementarity framework
when their minima individual demands are low. That will incite them to accept
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the offer of the North. Acting together, their transfer demands are increased due
to their strong bargaining power. Therefore, they are interested in extending
the negotiation. Thus, the delay can be interpreted as the means to affirm high
demands. The negotiation costs can be compensated by the anticipated higher
benefit in terms of transfers. Hence, the groups characterised by low minimum
demands are willing to claim more by being united.
We now focus on a situation in which the beliefs of the North lead to a sepa-
rating equilibrium with one of the Southern groups and to a pooling equilibrium
with the other, i.e. p+j > gj and p
+
k < gk, j 6= k. In this situation, group j
(whatever its characteristics) will accept the offer τ ∗(N,S+j ) at the first round.
Its utility is written:
Uj(τ
∗(N,S+j ), 0) = [τ
∗(N,S+j )− b−j ]Cj if Sj is of type b−j (23)
Uj(τ
∗(N,S+j ), 0) = [τ
∗(N,S+j )− b+j ]Cj if Sj is of type b+j (24)
The utility of group k is:
Uk(τNk, 0) = [τNk − b−k ]Ck if Sk is of type b−k (25)
Uk(τ
∗(S+k , N), 1) = δS[τ
∗(S+k , N)− b+k ]Ck if Sk is of type b+k (26)
The situations (23)+(25) and (23)+(26) are included in the cases previously
discussed. For the remaining situations, we limit ourselves to those in which
the negotiation delay appears. The situation (24)+(25) leads to the following
relation:
Uj(τ
∗(N,S+j ), 0) + Uk(τNk, 0) > U(τ
∗(S+, N), 1) (27)
For
b−k <
(1− δNδS)(δSCb+ − Cjb+j )− (1− δS)(δNδSCb+ − Cjb+j − δNδSCkb+k )
δS(1− δNδS)Ck
−(1− δN)(B −Bj −Bk)
(1− δNδS)Ck (28)
b+j and b
−
k will tackle the negotiations separately. When the Southern groups
are complementary and their individual demands high, they are willing to act
separately. On the other hand, when they are substitutable, they will act jointly
and force the negotiation delay because the beliefs of the North lead it to make
a low opening proposition.
Let us now analyse the situation (24)-(26). Two cases are conceivable accord-
ing to the response of the union to the initial proposition of the North:
Uj(τ
∗(N,S+j ), 0) + Uk(τ
∗(S+k , N), 1) > U(τ
∗(N,S+), 0) (29)
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or
Uj(τ
∗(N,S+j ), 0) + Uk(τ
∗(S+k , N), 1) > U(τ
∗(S+, N), 1) (30)
These two configurations lead to the same condition, namely equation (20). Thus,
although b+k bears a negotiation delay, disunity is still favoured. In the first
case, the complementarity allows b+k to affirm its demands by refusing the initial
offer of the North. Therefore the delay allows b+k to obtain what it expected.
However, when they are substitutable, b+k is interested in joining b
+
j to increase
its bargaining power and not to bear a delay. In the second case, the Southern
groups also favour disunity instead of union. Moreover, complementarity favours
b+j since it is induced to sign an agreement as of the first period, whilst, being
united or acting separately, b+k is still confronted with a delay.
To resume, the different configurations analysed lead to the following results:
in the presence of asymmetric information, when the Southern groups form a
union (when they are substitutable) the delay favours the North. That delay
corresponds to the time necessary for it to acquire the relevant information con-
cerning the demands of the groups. On the other hand, when the Southern groups
act separately (complementarity situation), the delay has several interpretations.
If one of the two Southern groups is of the type b+, while the other is of type b−,
the delay corresponds to the time necessary for b+ to dissociate from b−. When
both groups are of type b+, the delay is used by one and/or the other group to
affirm its transfer demands.
The comparison of equilibrium in complete and incomplete information in
multilateral negotiations game gives the following proposition:
Proposition 6 When both groups are of type b+i , the conditions of complementarity-
substitutability in presence of asymmetric information are identical to those ob-
tained with complete information. On the contrary, when at least one of the
groups is of type b−i , the conditions of complementarity (substitution) are wider
(more restrictive).
Within a multilateral negotiation with incomplete information, the existence
of information asymmetry reinforces the bargaining power of complementary
groups and reduces the power of substitutable groups. As with complete in-
formation, the complementarity, requiring the agreement of both groups, gives
them significant bargaining power compelling the North to propose a high level of
transfers. In this context, the one and/or the other Southern group will take ad-
vantage of its private information to increase its bargaining power and obtain an
agreement on a high transfer level. The advantages of complementarity are there-
fore reinforced by the lack of information of the North. Asymmetry of information
makes the conditions of complementarity obtained with complete information less
restrictive. On the contrary, in the presence of substitutable groups, the North is
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interested in acquiring information on the characteristics of the groups, in order
to oppose them by searching an agreement with only one of them. The possible
race downwards leads the Southern groups to reveal their private information re-
ducing their bargaining power. The drawbacks of substitutability are reinforced
by informational asymmetry since, if the Southern groups request high transfers,
the negotiations cannot be concluded in the first period. Thus, the conditions of
substitutability are more restrictive than with complete information.
Considering these results, the South will be interested in repeating the pattern
of the Kyoto Protocol. That is, the relatively rapid signing of a general agreement
which makes the Southern groups complementary, followed by a discussion about
the details (the Marrakech Accords in the case of the Kyoto Protocol) where the
separation in two complementary groups will give them strong bargaining power
to tackle the negotiations on the precise amount of the transfers.
Moreover, if both Southern groups have high demands, either complemen-
tary of substitute, they will never accept less than what they would obtain in
complete information. Likewise, the North will never offer more than the maxi-
mum amount of transfers that it would have proposed with complete information.
As an agreement is only reached with a transfer level corresponding to the de-
mands of the Southern groups, the presence of asymmetry of information does
not benefit them. Under these circumstances, the conditions of complementarity-
substitutability are identical with complete and incomplete information.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper has been to determine the different forms that the
international agreements to enlarge the Kyoto Protocol to include the developing
countries might take. The main characteristics of the negotiation are the pres-
ence of asymmetry of information about the capacities of the South to reduce
their emissions and the possibility to make the negotiations last more than one
round. Although we have analysed the climate change negotiations, the frame-
work developed is wide enough to represent most of the international negotiations
between the North and the South, as long as they deal with an issue where the
North is willing to transfer money (or other economic advantages) in exchange
of some commitment by the Southern countries; and as long as available data
about the North are more accurate than data about the South.
In a bilateral framework, we have shown that asymmetry of information is not
always beneficial for the developing countries coalition. Industrial countries will
be interested in continuing negotiations and may delay the moment of an agree-
ment to obtain information about the characteristics of the Southern coalition.
Compared to the outcome with complete information, the developing countries
will pay a negotiation cost due to the delay.
In a multilateral framework, the information asymmetry reinforces the negoti-
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ation power of the complementary coalitions, which will generally act separately,
and reduces that of the substitutable coalitions, which will generally act together.
Hence, the developing countries are interested in forcing a situation where they
are complementary by setting, at an early stage (pre-game) of the negotiations,
a high minimum level of ratifications for the agreement to come into force (as it
was done for the Kyoto Protocol). If the southern coalitions manage to become
complementary, they will act separately but the agreement will not be reached in
the first negotiation period. The delay can now be interpreted as the time needed
by the coalition with strong demands to dissociate from the coalition with weak
demands.
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APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 1
See Rubinstein (1985). Nevertheless, the general principle of the demonstra-
tion is as follows. Let us consider the history for which b+ and b− reject the offer
of N and suggest different offers in return. Let τ ∗(S+, N) be the offer of b+ and
τ−S the one of b
−, with:
B/C ≥ τ ∗(S+, N) > τ−S > τ ∗(S−, N) (31)
After the Southern group has made its proposition, N is able to determine the
characteristics of its opponent.
• Behaviour of N towards b+. Faced with a proposition τ ∗(S+, N), N identi-
fies its opponent as being b+. Knowing that it could not propose less than
τ ∗(N,S+) at the next period, it will accept the counter-offer. By offering
the transfer τ ∗(N,S+), its benefit is not increased compared to that which
it would obtain accepting τ ∗(S+, N) a period later.
• Behaviour of N towards b−. Two cases are possible:
Observing τ−S satisfying (31) and therefore strictly lower to τ
∗(S+, N), N
knows that it is confronted with b−. It just has to propose in the following period
τ−S −  > τ ∗(S−, N), with  → 0 in a way that Π(τ−S , t) < Π(τ−S − , t + 1).
That strategy is profitable as it can improve its benefit. On the other hand, it
deteriorates simultaneously the utility of b−.
Suppose now that N accepts τ−S . b
− is then incited to deviate as it knows
that N will also accept τ ∗(S+, N). Since both offers τ−S and τ
∗(S+, N) can be
accepted, b− is interested in requesting τ ∗(S+, N). 
Proof of lemma 2
For each of these two cases, we consider the game at any date t where the
Southern group is the proposer.
• b− makes an offer τS different from τN if the utility associated to its proposi-
tion τS is strictly higher to the one obtained with τN . However, the lemma 1
stipulates that the counter-offer of b− is equal to τ ∗(S+, N). The condition
is then written:
U(τN , t− 1) ≤ U(τ ∗(S+, N), t)
or
C(τN − b−)δt−1S ≤ C(τ ∗(S+, N)− b−)δtS
or
τN − [(1− δS)b− + b+δS] ≤ (τ ∗(S+, N)− b+)δS
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• Since b+ ≥ (1−δS)b−+b+δS, we obtain: C(τN−b+) ≤ C(τ ∗(S+, N)−b+)δS.
Thus, when b− refuses τN , b+ does as much.
• Suppose b+ accepts a proposition τN . Hence:
U(τN , t− 1) ≥ U(τ ∗(S+, N), t)
or
τN − [b−δS + (1− δS)b+] ≥ (τ ∗(S+, N)− b−)δS
Since b− ≤ b−δS+(1−δS)b+, we have C(τN−b−) ≥ C(τ ∗(S+, N)−b−)δS. 
Proof of lemma 3
Suppose the Southern group does not accept τN . The lemma (1) tells us that
the two types of groups will suggest the same counter-offer τS, with τS ≥ b+.
However, the highest proposition the Southern group can make is τ ∗(S+, N).
Hence, for any transfer τN satisfying the relation τN ≥ (1−δS)b+δSτ ∗(S+, N),we
have τN − b ≥ (τ ∗(S+, N)− b)δS. Therefore, the Southern group will accept the
transfer τN .
Let us specify the expression of the offer τN according to the type of the
Southern group. If the group is type b−, we have, for b = b−: τ−N ≥ (1− δS)b− +
δSτ
∗(S+, N) and for b = b+: τ+N ≥ (1− δS)b+ + δSτ ∗(S+, N) = τ ∗(N,S+).
Thus, although b− is incited to behave like b+ (according to lemma 1 and 2),
it will have more room to manoeuvre than b+ (according to lemma 3). I.e., its
set of satisfactory propositions is wider than the one of b+:
τ−N ∈ A = [(1− δS)b− + δSτ ∗(S+, N), B/C]
τ+N ∈ B = [(1− δS)b+ + δSτ ∗(S+, N), B/C]
and B ⊂ A. For δS → 1, we have τ = B/C. The behaviour of the Southern
groups b− and b+ coincides when b− is patient as they request both the highest
transfer that N can accept. Patience allows b− to claim the requests of b+. On the
other hand, if b− is impatient, its transfer demand becomes its reference transfer
for the negotiation. 
Proof of lemma 4
We successively present the behaviours of b−, b+ and N .
• Behaviour of b−:
b− will accept τN if that transfer level incites it, at the next period, to renounce
earnings associated to a proposition τ ∗(S+, N). It is enough that:
U(τN , t− 1) ≥ U(τ ∗(S+, N), t)
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or
τN − b− ≥ (τ ∗(S+, N)− b−)δS
Due to its preference for the present, we have:
τN ≥ (τ ∗(S+, N)− b−)δS + b− (32)
• Behaviour of b+:
If b+ prefers τS to τN , the following inequality has to hold:
U(τN , t− 1) < U(τ ∗(S+, N), t) (33)
or
τN < τ
∗(N,S+) (34)
• Behaviour of two types of groups:
According to equation (32), b− is not interested in refusing the offer τN since it
will not increase its payoffs by a counter-proposition τ ∗(S+, N). On the contrary,
according to (33), b+ refuses τN since it can enhance its utility by proposing
τ ∗(S+, N). Thus, for an offer τN satisfying the condition (13), b− has to accept
it while b+ can refuse it to propose afterwards τ ∗(S+, N).
• Behaviour of N :
If b− accepts the offer of τN while b+ rejects it to propose afterwards τ ∗(S+, N),
N is able to determine the type of its opponent. In fact, it knows that for a level of
transfers τN , satisfying (33), b
− should not reject it (while b+ should). N , knowing
the type of group it is negotiating with, will accept the offer τ ∗(S+, N). 
Proof of proposition 3
• If N opens the negotiations on an offer τ ∗(N,S+), its expected payoff is:
EΠ+ = p+[B − τ ∗(N,S+)C] + (1− p+)[B − τ ∗(N,S+)C]
= B − τ ∗(N,S+)C (35)
On the other hand, if it suggests the pure strategy τN satisfying (13), its
expected payoff becomes:
EΠ− = (1− p+)[B − τNC] + p+δN [B − τ ∗(S+, N)C]
According to lemma (4), the offer will be accepted by b− and rejected by
b+. The latter will propose the transfer τ ∗(S+, N), which will be accepted
by N in the second period. The strategy τN is optimal for N if and only if:
EΠ− > EΠ+ (condition 1 of proposition (3)).
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• If EΠ− < EΠ+, we are in the configuration where proposing τ ∗(N,S+)
is optimal for N . Since that is the highest transfer that the Southern
group can obtain in negotiations in complete information, it will accept it
whatever its type.
• If EΠ− = EΠ+, the sequential equilibrium consists for N in adopting the
mixed strategy τ ∗(N,S+) with the probability α and the strategy τ ∗(N,S−)
with the probability 1 − α with α ∈ [0, 1]. b+ will accept the proposition
if it is at least equal to τ ∗(N,S+) while b− will accept, in the first period,
any proposition satisfying (13). 
Proof of proposition 4
Since (13) is not verified, for τN = τ
∗(N,S−), the expected payoff of N is
written:
EΠ∗ = (1− p+)[B − τ ∗(N,S−)C] + p+δN [B − τ ∗(S+, N)C]
By comparing the expected payoffs associated to each strategy, we obtain the
searched result 
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